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89 
LAW AS TROPE: FRAMING AND 
EVALUATING CONCEPTUAL 
METAPHORS 
 
Harold Anthony Lloyd* 
 
I. EYELID MOONS AND MORE 
 
A. Kennings 
 
Like others who work with language, many lawyers no 
doubt appreciate good kennings: “beam from the eyelid moon” 
(gaze), “hat’s perch” (head), “head-sedge” (hair), “brow’s sky” 
(forehead), “serpents of the shield” (swords), “sword’s lair” 
(scabbard), “spear-meadow” (shield), “feeder of wolves” 
(warrior), “shield trees” (warriors yet again), “shield-storm” 
(battle), “spear-thaw” (battle again), “quarrelling of the swords” 
(battle yet again), “axe storms” (still more battle), “darts’ 
shower” (battle one more time), “spear-river” (blood), “wound 
sea” (blood again), “sea’s horse” (ship), “fjord’s-helmet” (ice), 
“pot snakes” (sausages), and “Odin’s ale” (poetry), just to quote 
a few.1 
However, metaphors also play a much deeper role in 
 
  *  © 2016 Harold Anthony Lloyd, Associate Professor, Wake Forest 
University School of Law.  This article draws from and expands upon 
portions of several earlier articles of mine including:  Narrative in Law and 
Life:  Some Frequently Asked Questions, THE SECOND DRAFT (2015); Plane 
Meaning and Thought:  Real-World Semantics and Fictions of Originalism, 
24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 657 (2015) (which more broadly explores framing, 
metaphor, planes of thought, and the inconsistencies of Originalism and how 
meaning actually works in the real world); Exercising Common Sense, 
Exorcising Langdell:  The Inseparability of Legal Theory, Practice, and the 
Humanities, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1213 (2014); “Original” Means Old, 
“Original” Means New:  An “Original” Look at What “Originalists” Do, 67 
NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 135-55 (2010).  I want to thank the faculty of Georgia 
State University College of Law for their lively comments and suggestions for 
this paper.  All errors and shortcomings are of course my own. 
1. KORMAK’S SAGA, SAGAS OF WARRIOR-POETS 5-67 (Rory McTurk et al. 
trans., Penguin Books 1997). 
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thought and law than style, ornament, or verbal virtuosity.  As 
we shall see, metaphors play a necessary role in our categories 
of thought.  As a result, metaphors are a necessary part of 
thought itself, including legal thought. 
 
 B. Categories 
 
To grasp this deeper role of metaphor, it helps to step back 
and briefly address the nature and purpose of categories.  
Categories are “sets of things” “treated as if they were, for the 
purposes at hand, similar or equivalent or somehow 
substitutable for each other.”2  (For purposes of this article, I 
will use “category” and “concept” interchangeably.)  Of course, 
whether something falls inside or outside any such category 
will turn “upon the criteria chosen to measure likeness or 
unlikeness.”3  When considering categories, lawyers thus need 
to understand and agree “upon the criteria chosen to measure 
likeness or unlikeness.”4  We will explore the importance of 
these conscious and unconscious criteria in more detail below. 
Why are categories important?  Lawyers (and all other 
thinkers) use categories to organize experiences in ways that 
make such experiences more predictable and thus easier and 
hopefully safer to handle.5  By categorizing experiences 
together, lawyers do not have to debate every experience in a 
vacuum, but can treat “similar” experiences in ways they have 
already decided.  For example, if a lawyer has decided that all 
of her associates are competent and are not likely to make a 
mistake when drawing up a deed, she can act accordingly 
without further analysis when she needs them to prepare a 
deed in the future.6  Of course, for these categories to be good 
ones, they must work “sufficiently well enough for [the user] to 
function.”7  We will explore workability in more detail below. 
 
2. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 20 
(2002). 
3. Id. at 49. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 21-26. 
6. See id. at 25-26. 
7. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH 21 (1999) 
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH]. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/3
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 C. Metaphors and Categories 
 
Exploring how categories can treat sets of different things 
as equivalent or similar leads us to an exploration of metaphor 
and simile.  Metaphors literally equate different things (as in 
“law is a gnarly tree”), while similes emphasize likeness 
without the bolder assertion of equivalence (as in “law is like a 
gnarly tree”).8  Despite their surface difference from 
metaphors, however, one can question whether similes are not 
also metaphorical at a deeper level.  To say “X is like Y,” do we 
not in some sense equate “X” with its referent?  Is this not 
equating something with what it is not?  Is this not therefore a 
form of metaphor?  Perhaps we should call this something like 
embedded metaphor?  Though I cannot resist raising these 
questions, I need not resolve them here since, as noted below, 
grasping the bolder claims of metaphor should also allow 
readers to grasp the weaker facial claims of similes. 
 
 D.Metaphors, Similes, and Law 
 
Metaphors and similes guide even the most mundane legal 
matters.  A simple contract for the sale of baseballs, for 
example, might specify that the balls must be “spheres.”  Such 
a specification is effectively either metaphor or simile 
depending upon what is meant by “sphere.” Since true or 
perfect spheres do not exist in the real world,9 the contract 
specifications would be metaphorical if “sphere” has the perfect 
geometrical sense never actually found in this imperfect world.  
 
8. See RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 100 (2d ed. 
1991) (emphasis omitted) (defining a metaphor as an “assertion of identity 
rather than, as with [s]imile, likeness.”).  For the difference between 
metaphor and metonymy (i.e., the use “of one entity to refer to another that is 
related to it,” such as when a server refers to a customer as “the ham 
sandwich” because of what he ordered), see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK 
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 35-40 (1980) [hereinafter METAPHORS WE 
LIVE BY]. 
9. See Robert J. Rovetto, The Shape of Shapes: An Ontological 
Exploration, RESEARCHGATE (Jan. 2011), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/288717561 (explaining the 
difference between geometric and physical shapes). 
3
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In such a case, the contract would be equating baseballs 
(imperfect spheres) with something not found in this imperfect 
world (perfect spheres).  However, if “sphere” instead means 
“something like an ideal geometric sphere,” we would have a 
simile in form at least.10  In either case, the applied “sphere” 
category would treat “sets of things” “as if they were, for the 
purposes at hand, similar or equivalent or somehow 
substitutable for each other.”11 
Additionally, we must speak metaphorically when we 
would populate the world with legal creations.  Fee simple, for 
example, does not exist in nature itself.  Pointing to any 
“parcel” of land as a “fee simple tract” necessarily equates 
something (dirt) with something else (fee simple) that does not 
really exist in the world.12  Of course, one might make the same 
point about non-legal concepts we create such as “dirt” and 
even “nature” itself.  A child’s notion of “dirt” undoubtedly 
differs from a geologist’s, yet they both apply those different 
notions to the same thing.  Similarly, an atheist’s notion of 
“nature” undoubtedly differs from a pantheist’s notion.  Yet, 
again, both apply these very different notions to the same 
thing.  I raise these non-legal points only to note that there are 
no natural categories apart from our definitional systems; 
categories, in other words, come from us and not from the 
world itself.13  As we shall see, good lawyers recognize and 
remain cognizant of this fundamental truth. 
 
II.  HOW METAPHORS WORK BY EMPHASIZING AND 
HIDING 
 
Since metaphor makes the bolder assertion of equivalence, 
rather than simile’s facial assertion of mere similarity, I shall 
focus on metaphor rather than simile for the remainder of the 
 
10. The question of embedded metaphors posed in Section I(C) could be 
posed here as well. 
11. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 20. 
12. See id. at 27-28.  Additionally, if we say that Blackacre is a 
rectangle, we use metaphor to the extent we frame Blackacre as a geometric 
space involving perfect lines, angles and points that can never exist in the 
real world.  See also Rovetto, supra note 9, at 1. 
13. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 50. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/3
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article.  Grasping the bolder claim of metaphor should allow 
the reader to grasp as well the functions of simile’s weaker 
facial claim. 
How, then, do conceptual metaphors work?  They have two 
primary functions: “highlighting certain properties” and 
“downplaying . . . [or] hiding still others.”14  For example, a 
husband contemplating divorcing his wife might refer to the 
same event by these very different statements: 
My wife whispered with another man at length 
last night. 
My wife had a quiet conversation with her 
brother last night. 
My wife talked quietly with her brother on the 
phone last night. 
My wife talked with her brother yesterday.15 
Although possibly all truthful, these statements highlight 
and downplay various aspects of what happened and are thus 
incomplete and biased.  The husband might well prefer the first 
statement as most consistent with his divorce aims.  However, 
a good lawyer cannot uncritically accept any such biased and 
incomplete statement.16  Instead, good lawyers consider what 
such statements highlight, downplay, and hide as they chart 
courses consistent both with their clients’ real interests and 
professional ethics. 
In fact, good lawyers know that forgetting what metaphors 
downplay and conceal can lead to real, physical disaster.  For 
example, a worker apparently once caused an explosion by 
discarding a cigarette into an “empty” barrel that had 
previously contained explosive chemicals.17  Downplaying the 
barrel’s previous explosive contents, an “empty” label 
presumably facilitated the disaster.18  As the poor worker 
 
14. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 163.  See also id. at 152.  
The nature of conceptualization, of course, requires this.  Since a concept 
differs from the thing conceptualized, there cannot be a perfect one-to-one 
match.  See, e.g., id. at 13. 
15. For another example, see id. at 163. 
16. Nor can a good lawyer-citizen do the same on broader social issues.  
For example, is welfare a “safety net” or a “handout?”  See AMSTERDAM & 
BRUNER, supra note 2, at 51. 
17. Id. at 142. 
18. Id. 
5
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learned the hard way, “empty,” like all other categories, can 
downplay highly-relevant information. 
Good lawyers also know that forgetting the incomplete and 
biased nature of metaphor can also lead them to miss 
opportunities provided by “the alternative categories [they] did 
not use.”19  This can apply at multiple levels, including both 
structure and strategy.  For example, a lawyer representing a 
client seeking “to lease” Blackacre does not represent her client 
well if she does not consider whether other possible means of 
controlling the land (such as a license or a purchase) might 
better serve her client.  To do that, she of course needs to 
inquire sufficiently about the client’s needs and interests.  If, 
for example, she finds that the client wishes to control the land 
for generations, she might better serve her client by suggesting 
a purchase.  Additionally, if that lawyer always sees 
negotiation as combat, she forgets that negotiation can be (and 
often ought to be) cooperative.20  She may thus unwittingly 
harm her client by negotiating a worse deal than she might 
otherwise have done. 
Remembering to look for the categories and metaphors in 
play is not always easy.  As Amsterdam and Bruner put it, we 
often “experience the world as categorized and simply take this 
experience for granted, as given.”21  At least ninety-five percent 
of thought may be “below the surface of conscious awareness,”22 
which means that we must constantly struggle to grasp what 
our metaphors highlight and conceal. 
 
  
  
 
19. Id. at 49. 
20. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 10. 
21. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 26.  In fact, Lakoff and 
Johnson maintain that we cannot “‘get beyond’ our categories and have a 
purely uncategorized and unconceptualized experience.”  PHILOSOPHY IN THE 
FLESH, supra note 7, at 19. For purposes of this article, I take no position on 
this issue.  However, even if we must always think with categories and can 
thus never have pure uncategorized experience, this of course does not mean 
that we cannot change the categories we use. 
22. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 13. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/3
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III.  HOW COGNITIVE METAPHORS ARISE AND CHANGE 
 
 A. Metaphors by Design 
 
We can consciously construct metaphors.  When we lack 
concepts that specifically apply to a given situation, we must 
either create new ones or “stretch” those that we have.  We can 
do this by using analogy or simile (X is like Y) or by using 
metaphor (X is Y).23  For example, to forge concepts that 
adequately fit atomic or chemical data that we wish to present 
to a jury, we might speak of atoms as little solar systems with 
electrons as planets revolving around a nucleus of protons and 
neutrons.  In doing this, we would focus on the similarities 
between the two parts of the equation and ignore the 
dissimilarities.  Of course, good lawyers ignore nothing of 
potential relevance and will keep in mind what such metaphors 
suppress and suggest.  A solar-system atom, for example, 
might suggest that neutrons and protons are hot, like the sun, 
while electrons are colder, like planets.  It might also suggest 
that electrons are solid and particulate like planets.  The 
metaphor presumably ignores such things as moons of planets, 
comets, and other things within solar systems but without 
obvious relevance to atoms.  This may ultimately work or it 
may not, depending on how close the correlations must be for 
jury purposes.  We explore workability in more detail below. 
 
 B. Metaphors From Early Experience 
 
We also carry forward metaphors based upon our early 
experiences.  As Lakoff and Johnson point out, many of our 
conceptual metaphors are rooted in our early experiences with 
the world.24  For example, children associate and conflate 
warmth and affection (their parents are warm when holding 
their children) and this carries forward into such metaphors as 
“a warm smile.”25  This also explains the apparent 
 
23. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 5 (emphasis omitted) (“The 
essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in 
terms of another.”). 
24. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 46. 
25. See id. (emphasis omitted). 
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inconsistency between such metaphors as “Conscious Is Up” 
and “Unknown Is Up.”  When we are awake (conscious) we are 
up; yet, things closer to the ground are easier to see than those 
high above.26 
Thus, we can understand the following spatial metaphors 
based upon our earliest experiences:27 
Metaphor: “Good Is Up”28 
Example: “Things are looking up”29 
Metaphor: “Virtue Is Up”30 
Example: “She has high standards31 
Metaphor: “Health And Life Are Up”32 
Example: “He’s at the peak of health.  Lazarus rose from 
the dead”33 
Metaphor: “Conscious Is Up”34 
Example: “He rises early in the morning”35 
Metaphor: “Rational Is Up”36 
Example: “high-level intellectual discussion”37 
Metaphor: “Unknown Is Up”38 
Example: “That’s still up in the air”39 
Metaphor: “Happy Is Up”40 
 
26. See METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 15, 20. 
27. I do not claim that Lakoff and Johnson would necessarily agree with 
the form of this presentation.  For example, they tie primary metaphors into 
a specific “sensorimotor domain.”  See, e.g., PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra 
note 7, at 50-54.  In the Appendix to this article, I set out these spatial 
metaphors in the broader context of other metaphors derived from early 
experience.  See also Harold Anthony Lloyd, Plane Meaning and Thought:  
Real-World Semantics and Fictions of Originalism, 24 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 
711-20 (2015). 
28. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 16. 
29. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
30. Id. (emphasis added). 
31. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
32. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
33. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 15 (emphasis omitted). 
34. Id. (emphasis added). 
35. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
36. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
37. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
38. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 137 (emphasis added). 
39. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
40. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 50. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/3
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Example: “I’m feeling up today”41 
Metaphor: “More Is Up”42 
Example: “Prices are high”43 
Metaphor: “Control Is Up”44 
Example: “I’m on top of the situation”45 
Metaphor: “Self Control Is Being In One’s Normal 
Location”46 
Example: “I was beside myself,”47 “He’s out to lunch”48 
Metaphor: “. . . Self Control Is Having The Self Together”49 
Example: “Pull yourself together.”50 
Metaphor: “Self Control As Being On The Ground” 51 
Example: “The ground fell out from under me . . . [h]e’s got 
his head in the clouds”52 
Metaphor: “Important Is Big”53 
Example: “Tomorrow is a big day”54 
Metaphor: “Intimacy Is Closeness”55 
Example: “We’ve been close . . . but we’re beginning to drift 
apart.”56 
Metaphor: “Similarity Is Closeness”57 
Example: “These colors . . . [are] close”58 
Metaphor: “Closeness Is Strength Of Effect” 59 
Example: “Who are the men closest to Khomeini?”60 
 
41. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
42. Id. at 51. 
43. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
44. Id. at 53. 
45. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 53 (emphasis omitted). 
46. Id. at 274. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 274-75. 
49. Id. at 276. 
50. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 276 (emphasis omitted). 
51. Id. at 275. 
52. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
53. Id. at 50. 
54. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
55. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 50. 
56. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
57. Id. at 51. 
58. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
59. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 128 (emphasis added). 
9
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Metaphor: “Purposes Are Destinations” 61 
Example: “He’ll ultimately be successful, but he isn’t there 
yet.”62 
Metaphor: “Means Are Paths” 63 
Example: “However you want to go about it is fine with 
me.”64 
Metaphor: “States Are Locations”65 
Example: “I’m close to being in a depression . . . .”66 
Metaphor: “An Argument Is A Journey” 67 
Example: “We have arrived at a disturbing conclusion.”68 
In exploring spatial metaphors, it is also interesting to 
note that categories themselves are often metaphorically 
conceived in spatial terms because we often perceive them as 
“containers” of things “with an interior, an exterior, and a 
boundary.”69  For example, as Lakoff and Johnson put it: 
“When we understand a bee as being in the garden, we are 
imposing an imaginative container structure on the garden, 
with the bee inside the container.”70  As they also note, such 
“containers” have “bounded regions, paths, centers and 
peripheries, objects with fronts and backs, regions above, 
below, and beside things.”71  Again, what we put in these 
containers will depend upon “the criteria chosen to measure 
likeness or unlikeness.”72 
Because of their shared nature, these “primary” conceptual 
metaphors73 are useful to note.  Since “everybody has basically 
 
60. Id. at 129 (emphasis omitted). 
61. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 52. 
62. Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted). 
63. Id. at 179 (emphasis added). 
64. Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted). 
65. Id. at 52. 
66. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 52 (emphasis omitted). 
67. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 90. 
68. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
69. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 20. 
70. Id. at 117. 
71. Id. at 508. 
72. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 49. 
73. According to Lakoff and Johnson, “primary metaphor[s]” have 
“minimal structure,” “arise[] naturally, automatically, and unconsciously 
through every day experience,” and serve as the “atomic” building blocks of 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/3
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the same kinds of bodies and brains and lives in basically the 
same kinds of environments, so far as the features relevant to 
metaphor are concerned,”74 these metaphors provide a common 
source of discourse of which lawyers may take advantage.  In 
the spirit of Lakoff and Johnson, I have set out in the Appendix 
and elsewhere the above spatial metaphors in the context of a 
much broader table, which also addresses other metaphors 
arising from the early experiences of vision, hearing, touch, 
taste, smell, matter, motion, and other things.75 
 
C.  Mutability of Metaphors 
 
Since metaphors either come from our reactions to early 
experience or are later constructed by us, we can try to change 
them.  A good lawyer understands this and does not fall into 
the trap of falsely believing in categorical immutability. 
Even some of the most seemingly-entrenched categories 
can be changed, since they come from us and not from nature.76  
For example, the centuries of denying women’s suffrage could 
seem so fixed that change would uproot nature itself.77  Of 
course, nature survived such change and lawyers aware of such 
history can see that nature will survive remedying other long-
standing wrongs as well.  Understanding this changeable 
nature of even “entrenched” categories can thus help lawyers to 
understand that progress is possible even in the most 
“entrenched” areas. 
 
D.  Flexible Logic 
 
In grasping the basic nature of metaphor, one must also 
understand its flexible logic.  The very fact that metaphor can 
 
more complex metaphor.  PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 46.  For 
example, a child’s conflating affection and warmth leads to the primary 
metaphor of affection as warmth.  Id. 
74. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 257. 
75. See supra note 27, at 711-20. 
76. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 36-37; Harold Anthony 
Lloyd, Let’s Skill All the Lawyers: Shakespearean Lessons on the Nature of 
Law, 11 VERA LEX 33, 42-45 (2010). 
77. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 44. 
11
 100 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  37:1 
equate “A” and “not-A” demonstrates metaphor’s power over 
traditional canons of logic, such as the principle of non-
contradiction which holds that something cannot both be and 
not be in the same way at the same time.78  Thus, despite our 
logic courses and despite our English teachers’ admonitions 
that metaphors should not be mixed, there are times when 
metaphors should be mixed, should contradict one another.  
Quantum mechanics, for example, tells us that light can be 
explained as both a particle and a wave.79  Of course light is not 
a particle (at least in the sense of the dust particles that 
traverse its beams) nor is it a wave (at least in the sense of 
waves that wash the beach under its beams).  Furthermore, 
quantum mechanics not only tells us to equate things with 
what they are not, but to contradict ourselves by calling light 
two different things: particles and waves.  Quantum mechanics 
does this because such a mixed metaphor can be required for 
good science.80 
Similarly, our early childhood experiences also teach that 
experience is not always consistent.  As we saw in Section 
III(B) above, consciousness is “up” because we rise from bed 
into our awake state.  Yet, as also seen in Section III(B) above, 
“up” is unknown and is beyond awareness because it is 
removed from our location on the ground below.  “Up” is both 
conscious and not-conscious.  And, as noted in the Appendix, 
time is both stationary and in motion: “Time flies,”81 yet, we 
have made it through another week.82  Good lawyers and law 
students thus understand that: 
 
To operate only in terms of a consistent set of 
metaphors is to hide many aspects of reality.  
Successful functioning in our daily lives seems to 
 
78. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 625 (Ted Honderich ed., 
1995) (“The conjunction of a proposition and its negation is a *contradiction 
and necessarily false.”). 
79. Franco Selleri, Preface to WAVE-PARTICLE DUALITY (Franco Selleri 
ed., 1992); see generally B. H. BRANSDEN & C. J. JOACHAIN, QUANTUM 
MECHANICS 760 (2d ed. 2000). 
80. See also id.  English teachers rightly shudder at carelessly-mixed 
metaphors: “Life’s sailboat often jumps its tracks.” 
81. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 52 (emphasis omitted). 
82. See generally METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 43. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/3
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require a constant shifting of metaphors.  The 
use of many metaphors that are inconsistent 
with one another seems necessary for us if we 
are to comprehend the details of our daily 
existence.83 
 
E.  Metaphors in Narrative 
 
Finally, metaphors are frequently infixed in narrative, and 
rival narratives can frequently interpret the same “facts” with 
equal plausibility.84  Failure to realize “that there is more than 
one ‘true’ story”85 can lead one to be “unconsciously captive to a 
set of unexamined assumptions based on narratives.”86  Linda 
H. Edwards, for example, explores how rival narratives of 
“hard-won freedoms secured by the American Revolution and 
the founding of the Nation”87 versus “the myth of redemptive 
violence”88 and its narrative of “the world as an 
overwhelmingly dangerous place, under attack by powerful evil 
forces”89 helped drive the case of an American citizen held as 
an “enemy combatant.”90 
More specifically, as Professor Edwards persuasively 
recounts, President Bush and the Fourth Circuit saw the arrest 
and detention of Hamdi through the lens of a dangerous-world 
narrative whose “only hope is a strong leader, who will save 
vulnerable mortals by defeating the powers that threaten 
them, thus imposing order and safety.”91  This strong leader 
was of course the President, and “[t]o defend us, the executive 
 
83. Id. at 221.  We can also see this flexibility in the inconsistency of our 
basic metaphors: “rational is up,” id. at 17 (emphasis omitted), yet, “unknown 
is up.”  Id. at 137 (emphasis omitted). 
84. See generally AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 111 (explaining 
that “stories construct the facts that comprise them”). 
85. Linda H. Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand? Hamdi, Myth, and 
the Master’s Tools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 52 (2013). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 64. 
88. Id. at 58. 
89. Id. at 61. 
90. Edwards, supra note 85, at 60-63. 
91. Id. at 54. 
13
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must be given a virtually free hand.”92  Consistent with this 
narrative, the Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the President’s 
broad powers.93  However, the Supreme Court saw the case 
through a different narrative lens.  The Court focused on the 
detainee’s status as an American citizen, as well as the 
importance of “the hard-won freedoms” won through the 
American Revolution; so viewed, the Court quite logically found 
that the President acted unconstitutionally.94 
As Hamdi demonstrates, those who miss the narratives 
surrounding metaphors and other categories not only miss 
much of what happened in a case.  They also miss much of 
what might otherwise have been done strategically and 
rhetorically. 
 
 
IV.     EVALUATING METAPHORS 
 
A.  Evaluation and Workability 
 
Once we understand the importance of metaphors 
generally, how do we evaluate metaphors in specific cases?  
How do we know whether they are “good” or “bad,” “right” or 
“wrong,” or “true or false,” especially given metaphor’s flexible 
logic noted above?  To answer these questions, we must return 
to the purpose of categories and other metaphors. 
Again, lawyers (and all other thinkers) use categories and 
other metaphors to organize experiences in ways that 
hopefully, among other things, make such experiences more 
predictable and otherwise easier to handle.95  By categorizing 
experiences together, lawyers do not have to reanalyze 
“similar” experiences, but can reuse metaphors and categories 
in ways they have seen already work.  For example, as noted 
earlier, if a lawyer has decided that all of her associates are 
competent and are not likely to make a mistake when drawing 
 
92. Id. at 63. 
93. See id. at 64.; see generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
94. See Edwards, supra note 85, at 64-66; see generally Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
95. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 21-23, 25-26. 
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up a deed, she can act accordingly without further analysis 
when she needs them to prepare a deed in the future.  Of 
course, the lawyer’s categorization of such associates (as well 
as the lawyer’s resulting decision to use such associates 
accordingly) must actually work in practice if the 
categorization is to be a good one.  One would not say that she 
has reasoned well if some of her “good” associates cannot in fact 
do good work.  Thus, at a minimum, good categories must work 
“sufficiently well enough for [the user] to function.”96  What, 
however, do we mean by the term “work”? 
 
B.  Four Factors of Workability 
 
1.    Predictability 
 
We can begin to uncover the sense of “workability” here by 
starting with logic’s distinction between valid arguments 
(where the conclusions logically follows from the premises) and 
sound arguments (where the premises and conclusions are all 
true).97  The following argument, for example, is valid (of good 
form98) but is not sound (not factually true): If clocks measure 
time, then I will become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
tomorrow.  Clocks measure time.  Therefore, I will become 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court tomorrow. 
Of course, I will not become Chief Justice tomorrow (nor is 
that status tied to clocks in the way claimed).  Despite its 
perfectly logical form, the argument above must fail because it 
predicts something that will not in fact happen.  Because of 
such inaccurate prediction, this argument does not work in the 
real world of experience, and we can thus see how 
predictability plays a role in workability.  For something to 
work, it of course must not lead to inaccurate predictions of 
how experience will unfold.  This is a pretty obvious necessary 
component of workability, though (as the following sections 
 
96. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 21. 
97. See LANHAM, supra note 8, at 168-69. 
98. It is a valid modus ponens of the following form:  If P, then Q.  P.  
Therefore, Q. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 78, at 
583. 
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show), it does not exhaust what we mean by “workable.” 99 
 
2.    Respecting Past and Precedent 
 
Respecting past and precedent can promote economy (not 
wasting effort solving problems already solved), fairness 
(treating similar cases the same), and predictability 
(permitting those contemplating future action to rely on past 
decisions, practices, and views).100 
Such respect for the past (though not unbending deference 
to the past) thus plays a critical role in legal and other 
analysis.101  For example, imagine that a parent starts giving 
his first child a weekly allowance when that child reaches the 
age of twelve and the parent is satisfied with that decision.  If 
the parent has no reason to think the “at twelve” rule did not 
work, why would it not be a waste of effort to reconsider the 
rule when the second child comes round?  Furthermore, how 
would it be fair to treat the next child differently unless the 
parent had good reason to do so (such as financial setbacks or 
the second child’s behavior)?  Any change could also generate 
confusion for the next child who, because of past example, had 
assumed his allowance would also begin at age twelve.  Why do 
that without good reason?  On their faces, similar economy, 
fairness, and predictability considerations apply lawyers, 
judges, litigants, and parties to transactions. 
Of course, these reasons for respecting past and precedent 
fail when there has been error, unfairness, or other reasons 
that require new thought.  Unbending deference to the past can 
generate unfair results (by perpetuating error or injustice or 
reaching wrong results in changed circumstances), thwart 
judicial or mental economy (by requiring periodic 
reconsideration or patches as discussed below where the 
 
99. See HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION 9-10 
(Blackwell 1995) (referring to “different types of ‘expediency’”). 
100. See DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1174 
(Oxford 1980) (“The main justifications [for stare decisis] are that it enables a 
judge to utilize the wisdom of his predecessors, that it makes for uniformity 
of application of law to similar cases, and that it makes the law predictable.”). 
101. See WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 41-50 (3d 
ed. 2014) (discussing the importance of precedent and tradition). 
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precedent simply does not work well in practice), and thwart 
predictability (by the doubt that hangs over questionable 
decisions or rules).  When this happens, the very reasons of 
economy, fairness, and predictability that generally support 
precedent require us to reconsider specific precedent.102 
 
3.    Simplicity 
 
Practically speaking, one should prefer the simplest of 
otherwise-equally effective decisions or rules.103  First, the 
simpler, by definition, should generally be easier to use.  
Second, additional complexity can increase the possibility of 
error.104  Adding more moving parts to a machine, for example, 
adds more ways for the machine to break.  Where a machine 
with one solid part works just as well as a machine with three 
solid parts, why would one choose the more complex device 
which is likely more difficult to maintain and offers three parts, 
rather than one-part subject to breakage?  Analysis of 
workability must therefore always involve simplicity analysis. 
Unfortunately, what is “simpler” is not always as clear as 
in the above example.  We can see this, for example, in cases 
where we can either replace something or “patch” or “rig” it.  
When our widget maker breaks, for example, should we patch 
the break or replace the entire machine?  A machine with a 
patch has an additional part lacking in an unpatched machine 
and is thus more complex in that sense.  However, the patch 
may have nominal cost and extend the life of the machine to 
the length of a replacement.  Measuring simplicity here in 
terms of the number of patches would be inadequate.  We 
should also consider the additional cost and effort required for 
a new machine (including new training), which are 
complexities actually avoided by the patch.  However, what if 
that “simple” patch is required every day?  At what point does 
it become simpler just to replace the machine?  The scientific 
 
102. Adhering to precedent can also promote simplicity and coherence in 
the senses discussed below, and any reconsideration of precedent should also 
involve these considerations. 
103. See generally RONDO KEELE, OCKHAM EXPLAINED: FROM RAZOR TO 
REBELLION (2010). 
104. Id. 
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revolutions from Aristotle to Copernicus to Newton to Einstein 
give us non-legal examples of how long it has seemed sensible 
to patch and rig failing models.105 
In matters of law, we also have similar struggles over 
whether and how long to patch or rig.  For example, if 
prohibiting same-sex marriage is a violation of equal 
protection, is it sufficient to patch or rig the problem by 
recognizing “equivalent” civil unions and continuing to prohibit 
same-sex unions?  From a simplicity standpoint, this is not a 
difficult question.  Here we either open up a working vehicle to 
others or require them to ride in a “separate but equal” new 
vehicle which we must now acquire and maintain.  To ask 
which approach is simpler really answers itself.  The mere fact 
of adding and maintaining a new vehicle alongside another 
already working one is on its face more complex.  The one-
vehicle solution on these facts is simpler, and the Supreme 
Court has sensibly ended the patching and rigging here.106 
 
4.    Coherence in the Broadest Sense 
 
To manage experience, concepts must furthermore work 
with every relevant aspect of experience.  In other words, they 
must fit with every relevant part of experience. William James 
succinctly describes such coherence as “what fits every part of 
life best and combines with the collectivity of experience’s 
demands, nothing being omitted.” 107 
Taking experience in its broadest sense, experience will 
include, without limitation, objective experience (such as my 
current body temperature), subjective experience (such as my 
current private thoughts and speculations about my current 
body temperature), and personal and community values and 
standards. 
Something may work in one form of such experience and 
yet fail in another.  When that happens, overall coherence fails.  
For example, I might objectively solve a need for money by 
 
105. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996) (discussing patching and replacing various 
scientific models over time). 
106. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
107. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 32 (Dover 1995) (emphasis added). 
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simply stealing it.  However, that would run afoul of both my 
personal values and moral values and standards.  Stealing 
would thus not be a workable solution because it would not fit 
with all such experience. 
Similarly, in matters of law, a metaphor or concept may 
fail to cohere with the whole of experience.  A state, for 
example, might need land for a roadway and might conceive 
that simply seizing the land without compensation would be 
the simplest and thus best solution.  It would involve only one 
step, while taking and paying would involve two steps.  
However, that “simplest” solution would not work because it 
would not fit with the limitations on the powers of states to 
take private property without just compensation.108  
Additionally, it would not fit with moral experience: it is 
generally not right to take property without paying for it.  
Though I have criticized natural law theory and found it 
generally wanting,109 natural law does bring insight in this 
regard.  When considering legal categories and other 
metaphors, moral experience is part of the total of experience 
we should consider. 
 
 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 
Though perhaps better known for their stylistic use of 
metaphor, lawyers’ substantive use of metaphor drives the law.  
Like other disciplines, law requires its categories and thus its 
metaphors. 
For utility’s sake, lawyers put similar things in categories 
and thereby treat them as categorically the same.  However, 
good lawyers understand that such categorical equating is not 
literally true, since nothing truly is what it is not.  Instead, 
good lawyers understand the metaphorical nature of 
categorization. 
Good lawyers also understand the need to identify both the 
conscious and unconscious metaphors in play in a given 
situation.  They understand the need to avoid uncritically 
 
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
109. See supra note 76, at 42-53. 
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accepting others’ metaphors, categories, and narratives, the 
need, where possible, to construct metaphors, categories, and 
narratives that benefit one’s case, and the need to be aware of 
what operative metaphors, categories, and narratives highlight 
and conceal so that one can proceed accordingly and avoid 
surprise. 
Good lawyers further understand that predictability, 
precedent, simplicity, and coherence in the broadest sense also 
help them evaluate their own categories and other metaphors 
and the “flexible” logic of metaphor discussed above.  These 
tests also help good lawyers evaluate the categories and 
metaphors of others. 
Finally, good lawyers understand that metaphor is more 
than powerful kennings or stylistic flourish.  Metaphor is more 
than blood as “raven-wine,” more than raven as “battle-gull.”110  
Metaphor lives in and generates much blood, flesh, and bone of 
that living thing we call the law.  
  
 
110. THE SAGA OF HALLFRED TROUBLESOME POET, SAGAS OF WARRIOR 
POETS 92 (Rory McTurk, trans., Penguin Books 1997). 
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APPENDIX 
OVERVIEW OF COMMON CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS111 
I. Metaphors Based Upon Experience of Space112 
Metaphor: “Good Is Up” (MWLB 16) 
Example: “Things are looking up” (MWLB 16) 
Metaphor: “Virtue Is Up” (MWLB 16) 
Example: “She has high standards (MWLB 16) 
Metaphor: “Health And Life Are Up” (MWLB 15) 
Example: “He’s at the peak of health,” “Lazarus rose from the dead” 
(MWLB 15) 
Metaphor: “Conscious Is Up” (MWLB 15) 
Example: “He rises early in the morning” (MWLB 15) 
Metaphor: “Rational Is Up” (MWLB 17) 
Example: “high-level intellectual discussion” (MWLB 17) 
Metaphor: “Unknown Is Up” (MWLB 137) 
Example: “That’s still up in the air” (MWLB 137) 
Metaphor: “Happy Is Up” (PIF 50) 
Example: “I’m feeling up today” (PIF 50) 
Metaphor: “More Is Up” (PIF 51) 
Example: “Prices are high” (PIF 50) 
Metaphor: “Control Is Up” (PIF 53) 
Example: “I’m on top of the situation” (PIF 53) 
Metaphor: “Self Control Is Being In One’s Normal Location” (PIF 274) 
 
111. See also Lloyd, supra note 27, at 711-20.  I use the term “common” 
here more broadly than the term “primary,” as that latter term is used in 
primary metaphor theory (which holds that there are “atomic” or primary 
metaphors that make up more complex metaphors).  See PHILOSOPHY IN THE 
FLESH, supra note 7, at 46.  Many of these metaphors are based upon our 
early experiences with the world.  Id.  For example, again, children link 
warmth and affection, a link carried forward in such metaphors as “a warm 
smile.”  Id.  Again, this also explains the apparent inconsistency between 
such metaphors as “Conscious Is Up” and “Unknown Is Up.”  When we are 
awake (conscious) we are up; yet, things nearer to the ground are easier to 
see than those higher above.  See METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 15, 
20. 
112. The headings and arrangement here are mine and I do not claim 
that Lakoff and Johnson would fully agree with what I have done.  For 
example, they tie primary metaphors into a specific “sensorimotor domain.”  
See, e.g., PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 50-54.  To save space, 
sourcing is indicated in each line as follows: (PIF 50) means PHILOSOPHY IN 
THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 50, and (MWLB 50) means METAPHORS WE LIVE 
BY, supra note 8, at 50.  An asterisk indicates my own example. 
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Example: “I was beside myself,” “He’s out to lunch” (PIF 274-275) 
Metaphor: “Self Control Is Having The Self Together” (PIF 276) 
Example: “Pull yourself together.” (PIF 276) 
Metaphor: Self Control As Being On The Ground” (PIF 275) 
Example: “The ground fell out from under me,” “head in the clouds” (PIF 
275) 
Metaphor: “Important Is Big” (PIF 50) 
Example: “Tomorrow is a big day” (PIF 50) 
Metaphor: “Intimacy Is Closeness” (PIF 50) 
Example: “We’ve been close . . . but we’re beginning to drift apart.” (PIF 
50) 
Metaphor: “Similarity Is Closeness” (PIF 51) 
Example: “These colors . . . [are] close” (PIF 51) 
Metaphor: “Closeness Is Strength Of Effect” (MWLB 128) 
Example: “Who are the men closest to Khomeini?” (MWLB 129) 
Metaphor: “Purposes are destinations” (PIF 52) 
Example: “He’ll ultimately be successful, but he isn’t there yet.” (PIF 53) 
Metaphor: “Means Are Paths” (PIF 179) 
Example: “However you want to go about it is fine with me” (PIF 191) 
Metaphor: States Are Locations” (PIF 52) 
Example: “I’m close to being in a depression . . . .” (PIF 52) 
Metaphor: “Argument Is A Journey” (MWLB 90)113 
Example: “We have arrived at a disturbing conclusion. (MWLB 90) 
 
II. Metaphors Based Upon Experience of Matter in Space 
Metaphor: The Mind Is A Container (PIF 338) 
Example: “He has an empty head”* 
Metaphor: The Mind Is A Theatre (PIF 339) 
Example: “I watched our ideas play out.”* 
Metaphor: “The Mind Is A Machine” (PIF 247, 547) 
Examples: “turning out ideas,” “mental breakdown” (PIF 247) 
Metaphor: “The Mind Is A Brittle Object” (MWLB 28) 
Example: “Her ego is very fragile,” “He cracked up” (MWLB 28) 
Metaphor: Ideas Are Inanimate Objects (PIF 240) 
 
113. This could also of course be classed in the motion through space 
category below.  I invite the reader to try to reclassify (or put in multiple 
classes) as many of these metaphors as she can. 
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Example: Putting “the idea under a microscope” (PIF 241) 
Metaphor: Ideas Are Animate Objects (MWLB 47) 
Examples: “a budding theory,” a theory still in its infancy (MWLB 47) 
Metaphor: Thought Is “Object Manipulation” (PIF 546) 
Example: “Complex ideas can be crafted, fashioned, shaped. . .” (PIF 240) 
Metaphor: “Life Is A Container” (MWLB 51) 
Example: “Life is empty for him” (MWLB 51) 
Metaphor: The Self Is A “Container” (PIF 275) 
Examples: “I was beside myself,” Being “out of your mind/head/skull” 
(PIF 275) 
Metaphor: “Visual Fields Are Containers” (MWLB 30) 
Example: “That’s in the center of my field of vision” (MWLB 30) 
Metaphor: “Categories Are Containers” (PIF 51) 
Example: “Are tomatoes in the fruit or vegetable category?” (PIF 51) 
Metaphor: “Linguistic Expressions Are Containers” (MWLB 10) 
Example: “His words carry little meaning” (MWLB 11) 
Metaphor: “Argument Is A Container” (MWLB 92) 
Example: “That argument has holes in it.” (MWLB 92) 
Metaphor: “Argument Is A Building” (MWLB 98) 
Example: “We’ve got the framework for a solid argument” (MWLB 98) 
Metaphor: “Memory Is A Storehouse” (PIF 240) 
Example: “Teaching is putting ideas into the minds of students” (PIF 240) 
Metaphor: “Remembering Is Retrieval (Or Recall)” (PIF 240) 
Example: I can recall every detail of the event* 
Metaphor: “Organization Is Physical Structure” (PIF 51) 
Example: “How do the pieces of this theory fit together?” (PIF 51) 
Metaphor: “Understanding Is Grasping” (PIF 54) 
Example: ability “to grasp transfinite numbers” (PIF 54) 
Metaphor: “Purposes Are Desired Objects” (PIF 53) 
Example: “I saw an opportunity . . . and grabbed it” (PIF 53) 
Metaphor: “Difficulties Are Burdens” (PIF 50) 
Example: “She’s weighed down by responsibilities” (PIF 50) 
Metaphor: “More Of Form Is More Of Content” (MWLB 127) 
Example: “He is very very very tall.” (MWLB 127) 
Metaphor: “Vitality Is A Substance” (MWLB 51) 
Example: “I’m drained,” “That took a lot out of me” (MWLB 51) 
Metaphor: “Love Is A Patient” (MWLB 49) 
Example: “This is a sick relationship” (MWLB 49) 
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III. Metaphors Based Upon Experience of Motion in Space 
Metaphor: “Thinking Is Moving”  (PIF 236) 
Examples: “My mind wandered,” “line of reasoning,” “flights of fancy” 
(PIF 236) 
Metaphor: “Time Is Motion” (PIF 52) 
Example: “Time flies” (PIF 52) 
Metaphor: “Time Is Stationary And We Move Through It” (MWLB 43) 
Example: “As we go through the years , . . .” (MWLB 43) 
Metaphor: “Change Is Motion” (PIF 52) 
Example: “My car has gone from bad to worse lately” (PIF 52) 
Metaphor: “Actions Are Self-propelled Movements” (PIF 187) 
Example: “I’m moving right along on the project” (PIF 52) 
Metaphor: “Difficulties Are Impediments To Movement” (PIF 202) 
Example: “We ran into a brick wall” (PIF 189) 
Metaphor: Freedom To Act Is “Lack Of Impediment To Movement” (PIF 
188) 
Examples: “Break out of your daily routine” (PIF 188) 
Metaphor: “Communication Is Sending” (MWLB 10) 
Examples: “Your reasons came through to us” (MWLB 10) 
 
IV. Metaphors Otherwise Based Upon the Five Senses or Other Experience 
(“Thinking Is Perceiving” (PIF 238)) 
1. Vision 
Metaphor: “Knowing Is Seeing” (PIF 53) 
Example: “I see what you mean.” (PIF 54) 
Metaphor: “Being Ignorant Is Being Unable To See” (PIF 238) 
Example: Being “in the dark.” (PIF 239) 
Metaphor: “Paying Attention Is Looking At” (PIF 238) 
Example: “Pointing something out.” (PIF 239) “Keep your eye on the 
ball.”* 
Metaphor: “Deception Is Purposefully Impeding Vision” (PIF 238) 
Examples: “cover-up,” “pull the wool over their eyes” (PIF 238-239) 
Metaphor: “Thinking Is Linguistic Activity” (Writing/Reading) (PIF 244) 
Example: “I can read her mind.” (PIF 244) 
2. Hearing 
Metaphor: “Being Receptive Is Hearing” (PIF 238) 
Example: I’m all ears* 
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Metaphor: “Taking Seriously Is Listening” (PIF 238) 
Example: “I always listen to what my father tells me.” (PIF 239) 
Metaphor: “Thinking Is Linguistic Activity” (Speaking/Listening) (PIF 
244) 
Example: I hear what you say.* 
3. Touch 
Metaphor: “Emotional Reaction Is Feeling” (PIF 238) 
Example: I feel bad for him* 
Metaphor: “Affection Is Warmth” (PIF 50) 
Example: “They greeted me warmly” (PIF 50) 
Metaphor: “Emotional Effect Is Physical Contact” (MWLB 50) 
Example: “I was struck by his sincerity” (MWLB 50) 
Metaphor: “Seeing Is Touching” (PIF 54) 
Example: “She picked my face out of the crowd” (PIF 54) 
4. Taste 
Metaphor: “Ideas Are Food” (PIF 241) 
Examples: “an appetite for learning,” “fresh ideas,” “spoon-feed” (PIF 242) 
Metaphor: “Considering Is Chewing” (PIF 241) 
Example: Chewing on an idea (PIF 242) 
Metaphor: Accepting Is Swallowing” (PIF 241) 
Example: A gullible person “swallows ideas whole” (PIF 243) 
Metaphor: “Personal Preference Is Taste” (PIF 238) 
Example: “A sweet thought” (PIF 240) 
Metaphor: Good Is Tasty* 
Example: A delicious idea* 
Metaphor: Bad Is Unpalatable 
Example: “Rotten ideas” (PIF 242) 
5. Smell 
Metaphor: Bad Is Malodorous (PIF 50) 
Example: “This movie stinks” (PIF 50) 
Metaphor: Good Is Fragrant* 
Example: This movie is sweet* 
Metaphor: “Sensing Is Smelling” (PIF 238) 
Example: “Something doesn’t smell quite right here” (PIF 240) 
6. Other Experience 
Metaphor: “Thought Is Mathematical Calculation” (PIF 405) 
Examples: “That figures,” “That just doesn’t add up” (PIF 406) 
Metaphor: “Explanation Is An Accounting” (PIF 246) 
25
 114 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  37:1 
Example: “Give me an account of why that happened,” “bottom line?” 
(PIF 246) 
Metaphor: “Causes Are Physical Forces” (PIF 53) 
Example: “They pushed the bill through Congress.” (PIF 53) 
Metaphor: “Argument Is War” (MWLB 4) 
Example: “He shot down all of my arguments” (MWLB 4) 
Metaphor: “Love Is A Physical Force” (MWLB 49) 
Example: “There were sparks,” “His whole life revolves around her” 
(MWLB 49) 
Metaphor: “Love Is Madness” (MWLB 49) 
Example: “I’m crazy about her.” (MWLB 49) 
Metaphor: “Love Is Magic” (MWLB 49) 
Example: “I’m charmed by her.” (MWLB 49) 
Metaphor: “Love Is War” (MWLB 49) 
Example: “He won her hand in marriage,” “He has to fend them off” 
(MWLB 49) 
Metaphor: “Life Is A Gambling Game” (MWLB 51) 
Example: “I’ll take my chances,” “It’s a toss-up” (MWLB 51) 
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